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I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

“Corporations are people, my friend.”1 Governor Mitt
Romney’s infamous statement at the 2011 Iowa State Fair
sounded ridiculous at the time. Over the past few years, as the
Supreme Court continues to expand the constitutional rights of
corporations, countless politicians have weighed in on the issue. In
response to Romney’s quip, Senator Elizabeth Warren fired,
“Corporations are not people. People have hearts . . . they live,
they love and they die and that matters.” 2
*J.D., 2016, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; B.A.
Philosophy, 2013 DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Governor Mitt Romney, Address at the Iowa State Fair (Aug. 11, 2011).
2. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Address at the Democratic National
Convention (Sept. 5, 2012).
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Although
the
Supreme
Court
historically
granted
corporations a number of constitutional rights, the status of
corporations and their relationship to the Constitution is far from
settled. 3 In particular, the First Amendment poses a number of
difficulties for corporate rights. The Supreme Court did not
consider corporate free speech for the first time until 1978. 4 Only
after reconsidering the issue and overturning previous decisions
did the Court in 2010 announce that free speech applies to
corporations in the same manner as it applies to natural persons. 5
In 2014, the Court broadened corporate rights by extending
religious exemptions to for-profit corporations from laws that
substantially interfere with a corporation’s religious beliefs. 6
Unsurprisingly,
controversies
arose
over
the
seemingly
incomprehensible notion that corporations can think, speak, and
believe.
The Court’s recent interpretive trend immensely expanded
corporate rights to a point unprecedented in the history of
American jurisprudence. Over the past four years, the Court
reversed almost 200 years of legal precedent while establishing a
fundamentally
flawed
concept
of
corporate
personhood.
Unreasonably expanding corporate rights is the result of an
imprudent conceptual shift in understanding the nature of a
corporation. The Court no longer views corporations as entities
created primarily for economic purposes. 7 Corporations are now

3. Christopher S. Ross, Shall Businesses Profit If Their Owners Lose Their
Souls? Examining Whether Closely Held Corporations May Seek Exemptions
from the Contraceptive Mandate, 82 FORDHAM L. REV . 1951, 1997 (2014).
4. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (confronting the
issue of corporate free speech under the First Amendment through funding
ballot initiatives for the first time).
5. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(reversing the case precedent established in Bellotti); see also McConnell v.
Fed. Election Com’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (overturning Austin); see McConnell,
540 U.S. 93 (overturning Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); see also Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (overturning McConnell
and Austin); see Citizens United 558 U.S. at 365 (holding that the government
cannot restrict direct contributions to political candidates merely because of
the donor’s corporate identity).
6. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 821-22 (upholding corporate spending on ballot
initiatives as political speech under the First Amendment); see also Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that for-profit
corporations are exempt from the Affordable Healthcare Act based on sincere
religious objections to the contraceptive mandate).
7. Brendan (Bo) F. Pons, Article, The Law and Philosophy of Personhood:
Where Should South Dakota Abortion Law Go from Here?, 58 S.D. L. REV . 119,
140 (2013) (explaining that an aggregate theory interpretation of corporate
personhood is contingent upon the corporation being recognized as a group of
individuals); see also Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of
Client Identity in the Context of Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV . 181,
194 (2013) (arguing that economics and efficiency cannot justify the
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perceived as collections of individuals. 8 Accordingly, the Court
expands corporate rights because it believes it is protecting the
rights of the individuals who operate and maintain the
corporation. 9
This Comment examines the transformation of corporate
personhood in American law. It challenges the logic currently used
to interpret and support corporate personhood, logic that permits
and even demands continued corporate right expansions. To
achieve this goal, Part II of this Comment divides Supreme Court
case law concerning corporate personhood into three eras: the
Early Era, the Intermediate Era and the Current Era. Next, Part
III of this Comment illustrates the rationale supported during
each era, the historical legacy of these laws, and their relation to a
continuously transforming concept of corporate personhood.
Finally, Part IV of this Comment challenges the current
conceptual understanding of corporate personhood under an
aggregate theory of corporations. It proposes returning to a
natural entity theory for interpreting corporate personhood by
limiting new expansions to issues directly related to economic
efficiency, rather than religious or political rights. Natural entity
theory is superior to aggregate entity theory because it supports a
clear and strong division between a corporation and its owners and
is conducive to corporate limited liability.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD
A.

An Overview of the Eras

The Early Era of corporate personhood began in 1886 and
continued until 1978. 10 This Era is easily recognizable because the
Court established a direct relationship between corporations and
persons under the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 11
application of aggregate theory to personhood concepts because it do es not
adequately address irreconcilable conflicts of interests).
8. Pons, supra note 7 at 140.
9. Nancy Kubasek, M. Neil Browne & Julie Harris, The Social Obligation
of Corporate Counsel: A Communitarian Justification for Allowing In -House
Counsel to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 11 G EO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 667
n.96 (1998) (asserting that supporters of the aggregate theory sought an antiregulatory approach that protected shareholders’ interests).
10. Santa Clara Cty v. S. P.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (recognizing
corporations “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment for the first in
history); see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765 (shifting focus to the First Amendment
and exchanging its previous economic concerns for political issues while
expanding the boundaries of corporate personhood).
11. See Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 394 (stating “[t]he court does not wish to
hear arguments on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
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However, this Era was not exclusively limited to Fourteenth
Amendment analysis and application. The Court considered the
Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Amendments as well. 12 Generally, the
expansion of corporate rights during the Early Era was smooth,
precise, and purposeful. 13 The Court afforded corporations greater
power to conduct their business freely and effectively. 14 It is not
coincidental that this Era coincides with the United States’
greatest economic achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. 15
The Intermediate Era, 1978 – 2009, marks a notable shift in
the Court’s focus from the Fourteenth Amendment to expanding
First Amendment rights for corporations. However, the Court did
not operate as smoothly as it previously had in the Early Era. The
Court seemed uncertain, inconsistent, and unpredictable during
the Intermediate Era. Additionally, the Court abandoned its
reliance on the economic functions of corporations and instead
adopted a noticeably more political view of corporations.
The transition into the Current Era, in 2010, inverts nearly
200 years of the corporate personhood doctrine with a massive
upheaval of the Intermediate Era decisions. The Court continues a
more political focus on the issue of corporate personhood. 16
Altering its view of corporations, the Court expands the scope of
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these
corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does”). This language is
originally included in a headnote to the Santa Clara case. Id. It essentially
created the link between corporations and persons – corporate personhood –
and continues to resonate even today. See Jennifer Jorczak, Note, “Not Like
You and Me”: Hobby Lobby, the Fourteenth Amendment, and What the Further
Expansion of Corporate Personhood Means for Individual Rights , 80 BROOK. L.
REV . 285, 294 (2014) (recognizing the importance of the “mistaken Santa Clara
headnote” and the continual issues it still causes today).
12. See generally Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (affording
corporations protection from unreasonable search and seizures); see generally
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (enlarging the
scope of corporate rights to include the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see generally Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)
(granting corporations the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment).
13. Infra, IIIB (explaining the conceptual underpinning upon which Early
Era cases were established).
14. Id.
15. See generally J. Bradford DeLong, The Shape of Twentieth Century
Economic History (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7569,
2000)
www.nber.org/papers/w7569.pdf
(proposing
that
the
defining
characteristic of the twentieth century is an “overwhelmingly economic
history”).
16. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (overturning both Austin and
McConnell, the Court affords corporations seemingly unrestricted rights to
Free Speech under the First Amendment identical to those of natural
persons). This allows corporations the free speech right to donate money from
their general treasury directly to political campaigns. Id.
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corporate First Amendment rights under the Free Speech Clause
and Free Exercise Clause to levels unprecedented in the history of
American jurisprudence. 17

B. The Early Era – Corporate Personhood is Born
Most legal historians cite 1819 as the first appearance of
corporate personhood as a concept in American law. 18 In Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward the Court recognized the
legitimacy of Dartmouth’s corporate charter, granted by the
British Crown before the United States won its independence. 19
According to the Court, the charter permitted the college to
purchase property and enter into contracts without requiring
natural persons to intervene. 20 Here, corporate personification was
indirect and merely served as an analogy to preserve property and
contract interests. 21 The first, direct appearance of corporate
personhood did not occur until more than half a century later. 22
In 1886, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.
included a headnote documenting the Court’s unanimous
stipulation that corporations are persons within the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Historically, this headnote marks the
first direct connection between corporations and persons and gave
rise to over two centuries of legal precedent. 24

17. Id.; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (recognizing a for-profit corporation’s
right to religious exemption for federal law under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, in essence recognizing a corporation’s right to free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment).
18. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV . 1629, 1635 (2011) (explaining that in Dartmouth “the Court developed its
personification of the corporation”); see also Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (holding that a charter between Dartmouth and
the British Crown was not dissolved after the American Revolution). The
charter still constituted a contract within the meaning of Article I §10 of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10; see also Dartmouth, 17
U.S. at 628 (noting that Article I § 10 of the Constitution prohibits States from
passing laws which impair contractual obligations).
19. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 518.
20. Id. at 667-68 (noting that a corporation can sue and be sued as well as
enter into contracts) (Story, J., concurring).
21. Pollman, supra note 18, at 1635 (stating, “[Dartmouth] illustrates how
the concession theory animated the Supreme Court’s early view of the
corporation and its early jurisprudence using the person metaphor to protect
property and contract interests”).
22. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 369 (alluding to a direct relationship between
corporations and persons for the first time in the history of American law).
23. Id.
24. Adam J. Sulkowski, Ultra Vires Statutes: Alive, Kicking, and A Means
of Circumventing the Scalia Standing Gauntlet in Environmental Litigation,
24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 75, 98 n.122 (2009).
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The Supreme Court issued a number of subsequent decisions
relying on the Santa Clara headnote. 25 Each decision helped shape
the status of corporate personhood under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Lochner v. New York, the Court protected a
corporation’s right to freely contract labor. 26 It did so by striking
down a New York law that restricted bakery employees from
working more than sixty hours in one week or ten hours in one
day. 27
According
to
the Court, the New York law
unconstitutionally deprived corporations of their liberty to freely
create contracts. 28 The Court viewed this statute as a violation of
the Due Process Clause because it imposed undue restrictions on
employee labor hours. 29 Although restrictions on labor hours seem
entirely reasonable by modern standards, in 1905 the Court did
not agree. 30 Thus, the Court’s stance on autonomous business
practices in the early 20th century helped solidify corporations’
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 31
Nearly thirty years after Lochner, the Court reaffirmed
corporate personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Louis
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, the Court held that taxing a corporation at
higher rates because the corporation owns multiple store chains
was unconstitutional. 32 The effect of this law was twofold. First, it
25. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428-29 (stating “[a] corporation is
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it”) (quoting, Marshall, C.J.)
(Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 667).
26. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (invalidating a New York
State law that prevented bakery employees from working more than 60 hours
in one week or 10 hours in one day based on procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
27. Id. at 53 (recognizing that the statute interferes with the right of a
corporation – here personified by the bakery owner – to freely contract
concerning the number of hours an employee may work).
28. Id. at 64 (stating that the right of the “master and employee to
contract” cannot be interfered with by the State without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See supra note 26 (explaining Lochner).
30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62 (stating that respondent’s argument that
labor hour restrictions are valid and permissible is insufficient to justify such
an interference).
31. Although the decision of Lochner was later overturned on other
grounds, Due Process protection for corporations still stands. See Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (overturning the prohibition against state
legislatures from restricting absolute autonomy in business practices). The
Lochner precedent lead to a number of unintended consequences, such as
striking down minimum wages for women and setting a standard weight for a
loaf of bread. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking
down setting minimum wages for women); see also, Jay Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (striking down legislation that attempted to set a
standard weight for a loaf of bread).
32. See generally Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (ruling
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increased taxes for local companies which owned and operated
store chains in other counties. 33 Second, it simultaneously lowered
the tax rate of companies that were located in other counties but
conducted business locally. 34 The Court found no rational basis for
a classificatory distinction between locally owned businesses that
operated locally and non-regional businesses that operated
locally. 35 This decision strengthened the conceptual link between
corporations and natural persons by advancing the notion that
corporations are entitled to those protections afforded to natural
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. 36
Expanding corporate personhood under the Fourteenth
Amendment raised unique issues concerning corporate challenges
to state law. Notably, in the United States, individual states and
not the federal government create corporations. 37 This complicates
corporate challenges to state-based corporate regulations because
the provisions of the United States Constitution must be applied to
state law. 38 Through the incorporation doctrine and the concept of
corporate personhood, corporations gain a number of additional
constitutional rights beyond Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection and Due Process. 39

that a state statute violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by increasing taxes on corporations that owned multiple store
chains).
33. Id. at 534 (indicating the logical inconsistency of taxing business at
higher rates based on the location of their principle place of business when
both companies operate internationally).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 533 (stating that there exists no rational basis for the distinction
made in the legislative enactment).
36. Id. at 536 (“Corporations are as much entitled to the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as are natural persons”);
see also S. R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910) (concluding that the
plaintiff [a corporation] is within the meaning of a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore entitled to equal protection).
37. Ann M. Scarlett, Comment, Imitation or Improvement? The Evolution
of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada and Australia, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 569, 572 (2011) (noting
that in the United States, as opposed to other countries, corporations are
created by state governments, not the federal government).
38. Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation through
the Fourteenth Amendment Privilege or Immunities and Due Process Clauses ,
72 MO. L. REV . 1, 44-48 (2007) (noting the general history of selective
incorporation as advocated by Justice Black).
39. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (affording
corporations Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and
seizures); see Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 564 (enlarging the scope of
corporate rights to include the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); see Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (granting corporations the right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment).
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Originally, the Court only applied the Bill of Rights to the
federal government. 40 However, as early as 1897, the Court began
to recognize the importance of allowing corporations protection
against state and local governments under the Bill of Rights. 41
Since then, the Court continually expanded corporate protection
under most provisions of the Bill of Rights through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 The Court allows
corporations to invoke some Fifth Amendment rights in criminal
trials. 43 Additionally, the Court recognizes corporations’ rights to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. 44 Finally, the Court
guarantees corporations Fourth Amendment protection in their
commercial properties from unwarranted searches. 45
To summarize, during the Early Era, the Court focused on
apolitical corporate expansion. The Court did so through the
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments. 46 Their aim
was to support corporate economic efficiency by conveniently
extending personhood to corporations. 47 The pragmatic effect was

40. See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-49 (1883)
(dismissing petitioner’s claims because the Fifth Amendment, and Bill of
Rights in general, only applies to federal government); see also Scarlett, supra
note 37, at 536.
41. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 258 ( 1897)
(holding [7-1] that Chicago could not escape its duty to provide just
compensation for a physical taking merely because it was not the federal
government). Thus, the Court legitimized the application of the Fifth
Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause through the Procedural Due Process
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
42. See David S. Cohen, Comment, McDonald’s Paradoxical Legacy: State
Restrictions of Non-Citizens’ Gun Rights, 71 MD. L. REV . 1219, 1223 (2012)
(noting that the Supreme Court precedent uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply most of the rights protected under the Bill of
Rights, even though the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government);
see e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2012) (incorporating the right to
bear arms under the Second Amendment).
43. See generally Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 564 (holding that
the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause applied to corporation charged
with criminal contempt, where the trial ended with a deadlocked jury).
44. See generally Bernhard, 396 U.S. at 531 (denying a corporation’s
shareholders Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial and noting that
corporations generally retain Seventh Amendment rights to jury trial); U.S.
CONST. amend. VII; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (establishing the procedural
grounds for a shareholder derivative action).
45. See generally Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311 (holding that the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides identical protections to corporate in
their commercial buildings as individual citizens in their private residences).
46. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307 (affording corporations Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizures); see Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 564 (enlarging the scope of corporate rights to
include the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Bernhard,
396 U.S. at 531 (granting corporations the right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment).
47. Infra, IIIB.
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that corporations were now strengthened in their contract and
property claims.

C. The Intermediate Era – Corporate Personhood’s
Chaotic Childhood
Two features distinguish the Intermediate Era of corporate
personhood from the Early Era. First, the Court’s constitutional
focus during the Intermediate Era shifted towards First
Amendment rights for corporations. 48 Second, the Court’s
inconsistent decisions during the Intermediate Era created
confusion surrounding the extent to which the First Amendment
ought to protect corporations’ free speech. 49
Although not directly related to corporate rights, Buckley v.
Valeo is important to note as a prelude to the Intermediate Era
because it establishes the rationale advanced in subsequent
decisions. 50 In Buckley, the Court found that the government had a
compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 51 To
further this interest, the Court upheld a limitation on the amount
that an individual can contribute to a political candidate. 52 The
Court felt that upholding this contribution limitation would
mitigate the appearance of political corruption. 53 In fact, the Court
felt so strongly about this solution that it found the limitation
created a constitutionally sufficient justification in and of itself. 54
The Court directly broadened corporate free speech for the
first time in First National Bank v. Bellotti.55 In 1978, a bank
48. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765; see also Austin 494 U.S. at 652.
These are two of the most significant cases in the Intermediate Era and the
focus exclusively on corporate free speech under the First Amendment and the
potential effects of political corruption. Id.
49. See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption and Complexity:
Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643,
652 (2011) (indicating the palpable tension present between Bellotti and
Austin).
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1; see Brian L. Porto, Esq., Where Do We Go from
Here? Vermont Campaign Finance After Randall V Sorrell , 32 VT. B.J. 30
(2007) (affirming limitations on political contributions in Buckley because (1)
contributing to a political campaign does not constitute speech, and (2)
preventing corruption is sufficient to justify limitations on campaign
contributions).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (quid pro quo contributions to current and
potential office holders, undermines the integrity of representative
democracy).
52. See id. at 143 (upholding the individual contribution limits).
53. Id. at 26-27 (noting the remedial effects of the campaign contribution
limitation on the appearance of quid pro quo corruption in the electoral
process).
54. Id. at 26 (claiming that it is unnecessary to analyze beyond the
contribution limit because it is a “constitutionally sufficient justification”).
55. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
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challenged
a Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting
corporations from spending money in political campaigns. 56 The
bank, a corporation, wanted to spend money on ballot initiatives in
order to publicize its political opposition to a proposed amendment
to the Massachusetts Constitution. 57
The Court wanted to preserve the integrity of the electoral
process. 58 It recognized that preventing political corruption is
undoubtedly a compelling state interest. 59 However, the Court
regarded the statutory means as inadequate to achieve that
purpose. 60 The Court struck down the statute for two reasons.
First, the Court viewed the statute as underinclusive because it
only prohibited corporations from expending funds on referendum
issues and not all political issues. 61 Second, the Court found the
statute overinclusive since it would prevent unanimous
shareholder decisions in support of ballot initiatives. 62 Thus, on
the narrow issue of funding ballot initiatives, the Court afforded
corporations First Amendment protection. 63
Twelve years later, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, the Court based its decision on the same compelling
interest from Bellotti: preventing political corruption. 64 However,
unlike in Bellotti, the Court in Austin upheld a statute, which

56. See MASS . G EN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (1986) (stating that, “[n]o
corporation carrying the business of a bank...shall directly or indirectly give
any money for the purpose of aiding, political activity”).
57. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95 (recognizing a compelling state interest in
preventing corruption via direct corporate donations to political candidates but
found the statues means insufficient to adequately further that interest).
Thus, the Court protected corporations’ rights to fund ballot initiatives under
First Amendment free speech. Id.
58. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89 (“Preserving the integrity of the electoral
process, preventing corruption, and ‘sustaining the active, alert responsibility
of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government’
are interests of the highest importance”) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d
821, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 795 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
61. Id. (finding the statute underinclusive because it does not prohibit
corporations from lobbying or voicing political concerns). Rather, it prevents
corporations from funding ballot initiatives concerning referendums only. Id.
Thus, the statute appears to silence corporate speech based on content. Id.
62. Id. at 794-95 (realizing that despite a unanimous consensus among the
shareholders of a corporation on a given political issue, the statute would
prevent that corporation from financially backing that cause) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
63. Id. at 795 (invalidating the portion of § 8 challenged by appellants
which prohibits speech) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64. Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 (“[T]hey [Michigan] are justified by a
compelling state interest: preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption in the political arena by reducing the threat that huge corporate
treasuries, which are amassed with the aid of favorable state laws and have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas, will be used to influence unfairly election outcomes”).
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prohibited corporations from directly donating to political
candidates. 65 This was the first time in the history of American
jurisprudence that the Court upheld direct restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures. 66
The Court distinguished the challenged statute in Austin
from Bellotti.67 It reasoned that individual citizens and
unincorporated unions receive far fewer state-derived benefits. 68
This fact distinguished individuals (and unions) from corporations
because it lessened the risk of political corruption. 69 The Court
recognized the dangerous relationship between corporations and
politicians created by direct donations. 70 To combat this issue, the
Michigan statute narrowly tailored restrictions on direct corporate
expenditures. 71
Several years later, McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission furthered the precedent set forth in Austin.72 There,
the Court sustained sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act (“BCRA”) that restricted corporations and unions from
expending their general treasury funds to pay for campaign
advertisements. 73 Contrary to its decision in Buckley, the Court in
McConnell favored the voices of one group over another – citizens
over corporations. 74 As a result, the Court’s analysis of BCRA in
McConnell led them to supersede the precedent established in
Buckley.75
65. See id. (upholding a prohibition on corporate spending in the electoral
process and finding that the state had a compelling interest in preventing
political corruption and the statute’s means effectively promoted that
interest).
66. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (stating that Austin marks the first
time in history that the Supreme Court upheld a direct restriction on the
independent expenditure of funds for political speech).
67. Id. at 665 (finding that even though the statute did not include
unincorporated labor unions within the purview of this prohibition, the statute
was not underinclusive).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 668 (noting that the Michigan statute illustrates the significant
possibility that political expenditures by corporations will endanger the
integrity of the political process).
71. Id. (stating that the statute “implemented a narrowly tailored solution
to that problem” requiring independent corporate expenditures from separate
funds significantly decreases the risk of injury to the political process).
72. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
73. See id. at 94 (prohibiting corporations and unions from “using general
treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have th e effect of,
influencing federal election outcomes” the Court upheld this provision of
BCRA).
74. See id. at 94 (allowing the federal statute to supersede their prior
holding in Buckley by upholding specific provisions of BCRF).
75. Lillian R. BeVier, Mcconnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's First
Amendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 140 (2004) (in sustaining the BCRA’s
restrictions on issue ads McConnell “permits the legislature to restrict the
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Comparing the frequency of cases concerning corporate
personhood between the Early Era and Intermediate Era
illuminates the indecisive and tumultuous nature of the
Intermediate Era. The Early Era spanned 92 years (from 18861978) and contained seven pivotal cases, which significantly
shaped the current concept of corporate personhood. 76 During the
Early Era cases emerged on an average of one every thirteen
years. In contrast, the Intermediate Era covered only thirty years
(from 1978-2009) and contained three cases, which altered the
concept of corporate personhood. The Intermediate Era saw a
significant increase in the frequency of litigation surrounding the
concept of corporate personhood with an average of one case every
four years. Additionally, the nature of the litigation was notably
different. The Court initially recognized the right to corporate free
speech followed by sharply curtailing that right in order to protect
individuals and prevent political corruption.

D. The Current Era – Corporate Personhood’s
Rebellious Adolescence
The Current Era began in 2010 with Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, which marked a pivotal shift in the
Court’s understanding of corporations and their constitutional
rights. 77 A nonprofit corporation, Citizens United, challenged the
constitutionality of a federal statute, which suppressed
electioneering communications. 78 The Court found the federal
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relevant voices
of others,” which is contrary to Buckley’s First Amendment analysis) (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
76. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 518 (personifying corporations for the first time
in American jurisprudence); Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 394 (directly equating
corporations and natural persons for the first time in American law); Lochner,
198 U.S. at 45 (recognizing corporations as persons under the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Lee, 288 U.S. at 517 (strengthening the conceptual
connection between corporations and natural persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Martin, 430 U.S. at 564 (applying the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause to corporations as natural persons); Ross, 396 U.S. at
531 (affording corporations Seventh Amendment rights to a trial by jury);
Marshall, 436 U.S. at 765 (providing identical protections to corporations and
natural persons under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
warrantless searches).
77. Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL
L. REV . 717, 719-20 (2011) (noting that Citizens United marks a significant
change in the Court’s interpretation of personhood). This significant
conceptual shift in understanding corporate personhood justifies a completely
new division in the historical boundaries of corporate personhood. Id.; see also
Ellis, Citizens United, 44 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV . 717, 719-720 (2011) (noting
that Citizens United marks a significant shift in the Court’s interpretation of
personhood).
78. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321 (defining electioneering
communication); see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) (electioneering
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statute’s prohibition on corporate expenditures created an
unconstitutional ban on political speech. 79 It recognized that
political speech is an essential factor in any successful democratic
society. 80 Since corporations are associations of individuals, the
Court adopted the view that corporations should not be treated
differently from natural persons under the First Amendment for
the first time in the history of corporate personhood. 81 Thus, the
Court expressly overruled Austin and McConnell, holding that
governmental attempts to suppress political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity violates the First Amendment. 82
The Court heavily relied on the corporate First Amendment
precedents of Buckley, Bellotti, and Austin.83 First, Buckley
explained the danger of expenditures in the political process as
quid pro quo corruption. 84 Since these corporate expenditures were

communication is a telecommunication broadcast which clearly identifies a
candidate for Federal Office made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a
general election); see generally 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (relevant federal statute
prohibiting electioneering communication).
79. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
80. Id. at 339-40 (“[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to
use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self government and a necessary means to protect it[]political speech must prevail
against laws that would suppress it”); see also EU v. San Francisco Cty
Democratic Cent. Comm’n., 489 U.S. 214, 233 (1989) ([the First Amendment]
“has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office”).
81. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 446 (declaring that the public must have
faith in its representatives to sustain a well functioning democracy); Id. at 343
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting, Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783) (rejecting the
argument that corporations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment because they are not “natural persons”).
82. Id. at 365 (“Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin [] should
be and now is overruled”) (citation omitted); id. at 311-13 (stating that
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity) (overruling Austin).
83. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312-13 (explaining the effects of
Buckley on the Court’s analysis); see also id. at 345 (explaining the effects of
Bellotti, contrasted with Buckley); see also id. (noting the effects of Austin on
corporate free speech).
84. Id. at 345 (relying on quid pro quo definition as defined in Buckley, to
distinguish direct contributions from independent expenditures); see also
Elizabeth Garrett, Campaign Finance in the Hybrid Realm of Recall Elections,
97 MINN. L. REV . 1654, 1686 (2013) (explaining that the Court had difficulty
after Buckley defining the nature of quid pro quo corruption and identifying
what is wrong with persons or entities expending substantial amount of
political contributions to a given candidate); see also McCutcheon v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (stating quid pro quo
corruption means, “a direct exchange of an official act for money”) (citation
omitted). Quid pro quo corruption literally means “something in exchange for
something” corruption. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (4th ed. 1996).

902

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:889

not direct favor-for-favor contributions, the Court did not view the
corporation’s speech as facilitating political corruption. 85
Next, Bellotti did not consider the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting corporations from
directly donating to political candidates. 86 However, the Court
assumed that the statute would be unconstitutional if it
underwent the analysis in Bellotti.87 Finally, the Court interpreted
Austin as an attempt to bypass the prior case law of Buckley and
Bellotti by identifying a new government interest. 88
On that basis, and with the above-mentioned rationale, the
Citizens United Court overturned Austin and McConnell.89 As a
result, the Court expanded corporate First Amendment rights by
allowing corporations to expend funds directly from their general
treasury to a particular political candidate. 90
Citizens United marked the end of corporate free speech
jurisprudence and served as the springboard for a new corporate
right: the right to free religious expression. 91 In Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court ruled the Affordable Healthcare Act
(“ACA”) contraception mandate violates the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). 92 Hobby Lobby is the first case

85. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (noting their departure from the
concerns of political corruption first voiced in Buckley because political
corruptness does not necessarily follow the potential influe nce a contributor
may have over a candidate after donating).
86. Id. at 348 (“Bellotti does not address the constitutionality of the State
ban on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates”).
87. Id. (reasoning that the First Amendment prohibits political speech
restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity).
88. Id. at 348 (stating that the Austin Court identified a new governmental
interest to bypass Buckley and Bellotti and suppress political speech; that
interest, prevents the negative effects of large amounts of wealth accumulated
by corporations that no connection to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas).
89. Id. at 365-66 (overruling Austin and McConnell stating that
restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are invalid).
90. Anne Tucker, Comment, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the
Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in
the Market, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV . 1299, 1346 n.211 (2012) (noting that the
Court in Citizens United ceased the opportunity to expand corporate speech
rights by overturning Austin’s and McConnell’s limits on corporate political
spending) (quotation omitted); see also Daniel E. Chand, Nonprofit
Electioneering Post-Citizens United: How Organizations Have Become More
Complex, 13 ELECTION L.J. 243, 244 (2014) (stating that Citizens United now
allows corporations to spend money in federal and state elections).
91. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (noting that Hobby Lobby marks the
first time in history the Court extended religious exemptions to for-profit
corporations).
92. Id.; see generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act,
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (requiring employers to provide contraception
coverage); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (holding that the
contraceptives mandate is substantially burdensome on the religious freedom
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in the history of American jurisprudence to extend the right of free
exercise to for-profit corporations. 93
Hobby Lobby arose from two separate federal lawsuits. 94 Two
families, the Greens and the Hahns, are the respective owners of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood (one of Hobby Lobby’s major
suppliers). 95 Both families hold deep and sincere religious
convictions that life begins at conception, and certain kinds of
contraceptives, which prevent the fertilization or maturation of a
fertilized egg, are tantamount to abortion. 96 Through their
corporations, both families sued to protect themselves from the
religious burdens of providing their employee’s birth control ACA’s
contraception mandate. 97
The Court granted relief, holding that Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood’s religious beliefs were impermissibly burdened. 98
Beginning its analysis of corporate personhood by examining
whether RFRA applied to corporations as well as natural persons,
the Court found that under the language of RFRA corporations are
people. 99 Even though RFRA does not expressly define a person,
the Court relied on the Dictionary Act to logically link corporations
to people. 100 The Dictionary Act explains legislative terms

of closely held for-profit corporations).
93. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2795 (“[U]ntil today, religious exemptions
had never been extended to any entity operating in “the commercial, profit
making world””) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
342 (1987)).
94. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.
2013) (holding that corporations are persons under the RFRA and they are
protected under the Free Exercise Clause); see also Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377
(3rd Cir. 2013) (holding that for-profit corporations could not bring a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause or assert a RFRA claim).
95. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (explaining the background of the
Green and Hahn families).
96. Id. at 2759 (articulating Hobby Lobby’s religious belief that four
specific contraceptive methods included under ACA cause abortions); id. at
2764 (expressing that the Hahns family believes that human life begins at
conception) (citation omitted); id. at 2766 (noting also that the Greens believe
life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate
access to contraceptive drugs).
97. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (providing the
background information upon which Hobby Lobby based its case).
98. Id. at 2785 (holding the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care
Act violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
99. Id. at 2768 (beginning an analysis of whether corporations are persons
under the purview of RFRA); see also, id. at 2768-69 (interpreting the use of
“person” under the RFRA includes corporations, regardless of whether the
corporation is for-profit or nonprofit).
100. 1 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise…the words person and
‘whoever’ include corporations”); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (noting that
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commonly used by Congress and includes corporations in the
definition of people. 101 Thus, the Court concluded that corporations
are people within the language of RFRA. 102
The RFRA prohibits government from enacting legislation
that substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion under the
First Amendment. 103 However, the federal government may
burden a person’s religious exercise if it can show: (1) the burden
is in furtherance of a compelling interest; and (2) the burden is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 104 The Court
found that the contraceptive mandate of the ACA substantially
burdened Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga Wood’s sincerely held
religious beliefs under the scope of RFRA. 105 According to the
Court, an analysis of whether a religious belief is actually
plausible is not required to determine whether that belief is
sincerely held.106
With Hobby Lobby’s personhood decided and RFRA’s
substantial burden requirement satisfied, the Court turned to the
least restrictive means test. 107 The Court found that the
Department of Human Health Services (“HHS”) did not use the
least restrictive means because the government could have
incurred the costs of providing contraceptives to women whose
employers objected on religious grounds. 108 Thus, the substantial
burden to Hobby Lobby’s sincerely held religious belief (that life
the RFRA does not define “person”); id. (specifying that the Dictionary Act,
includes corporations, companies, associations, etc. in its definition of
“person”).
101. See id. at 2768 (defining corporations as included within Congress’s
meaning of person).
102. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (holding that the language of the
Dictionary Act supports a conclusion that Congress intended RFRA to apply to
both for-profit and non-profit corporations in the same way it applies to
natural persons).
103. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012)
(“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability”).
104. Id. at § 2000bb-1(b) (“the application of the burden to the person – (1)
is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest”).
105. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775 (reasoning that the HHS
mandate requires the Greens to engage in conduct that violates their religious
belief that life begins at conception or incur penalties up to $26 million for
Hobby Lobby); see id. at 2776 (clarifying Hobby Lobby has a religious objective
in providing healthcare to its employees because their religious beliefs heavily
influences their relationships to their employees).
106. Id. at 2778 (rejecting that a religious belief has to be plausible to
qualify as a “sincerely held belief”) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989)).
107. Id. at 2780 (turning from the definition of corporations under the
Dictionary Act to the RFRA’s least restrictive means test).
108 Id. (holding that the government has failed to sho w it lacks other
means of achieving its goal without imposing a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion).
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begins at conception) violated the RFRA because the government
could have paid for the contraceptives that Hobby Lobby found
deplorable. 109
The inherently political and controversial nature of Hobby
Lobby sparked heated debate between the majority and dissent. 110
The dissent attacked four points of the majority’s opinion. 111 First,
the dissent disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the
RFRA. 112 The dissent noted that the Dictionary Act only applies
when Congress does not include an express definition in the
statute and the broader context of the statute does not indicate an
intended meaning. 113 Here, the dissent asserts that the context
indicated otherwise and that corporations are distinguishable from
natural persons because corporations lack the independent
cognitive faculties to believe.114
Second, the dissent drew a distinction between nonprofit
corporations, which have traditionally been afforded religious
exemptions, and for-profit corporations, which have never been
extended
religious
exemptions. 115
Nonprofits are allowed
exemptions from laws to accommodate religious objections because
the primary function of their corporation is religious and faith
based and they “exist to foster interests of people subscribing to
the same religious faith.”116 Conversely, for-profit corporations’
main function is generating capital. 117
109. Id. at 2785 (holding that requiring contraceptive coverage, as applied
to closely held corporations, violates the RFRA).
110. See id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, & Kagan, JJ.,
dissenting).
111. See id. at 2787-804 (attacking the majority’s opinion that: (1) the
Dictionary Act controls the language of RFRA; (2) for-profit and nonprofit
corporations are similar enough under these circumstances; (3) the
government’s failure to incurs the costs of disputed contraceptives constitutes
a substantial burden; and (4) the means were not the least restrictive in
furthering a compelling governmental interest).
112. See id. at 2793 (disagreeing with the majority’s use of the Dictionary
Act).
113. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 1 U.S.C. §
1 (West 2012)) (observing that the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” only
controls when the “context does not indicate otherwise”).
114. Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall C.J., in
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 634) (reasoning that the Court has previously refused
to provide religious exemptions to for-profit corporations because corporations
only exit in “the contemplation of the law” and religious beliefs are
characteristic of “natural persons”); id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466) (restating that corporations lack
consciousness, beliefs, feelings and thoughts).
115. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 344-46 (expounding on the difference between
nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations with regards to the free
exercise of religion).
116. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2795 (noting that religious organizations
[non-profits] are clearly distinguishable from for-profit corporations).
117. Id. (contrasting the differences between for-profit and non-profit
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Third,
the
dissent
disagreed
with
the
majority’s
interpretation of substantial burden under the RFRA. Under the
ACA, the requirement that corporations provide contraceptives is
contingent on whether employees request coverage. 118 It is possible
that a corporation will not be required to provide contraceptive
coverage because the employees and owners share similar
religious oppositions to contraceptives. 119 Additionally, the dissent
notes that there are circumstances in which contraceptives provide
legitimate medical benefits to patients beyond preventing
conception. 120
Finally, the minority opined that even if ACA’s contraceptive
coverage imposes a substantial burden, the means in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest - providing for the health of
its citizens - were the least restrictive. 121 The minority also
reasoned that requiring the government to fund contraceptive
coverage in order to not offend for-profit employers who oppose
contraceptives is not a viable alternative. 122 Requiring the
corporations). For-profit corporations are allowed exemptions for some federal
laws because they are expected to spend the money they generate on
community improvement within their particular faith group. Id. Non-profit
corporations do not share this characteristic. Id.
118. Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The requirement
[contraceptive mandate] carries no command that Hobby Lobby or Conestoga
purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable”); see id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he decision whether to claim benefits under the
plans are made not by Hobby Lobby or Conestoga, but by the covered
employees and dependents”).
119. Id. (noting that the ACA doesn’t force employers to actually provide
contraceptives, but rather provide the option for employees to obtain them.
Therefore, it is possible [if the employees of the company held the same deeply
rooted and sincere religious beliefs as the owners] that the corporation would
not have to provide any contraceptives).
120. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he government has shown that the
contraceptive coverage for which the ACA provides furthers compelling
interests in public health and women’s well being”); see also id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that contraceptive coverage (1) “enables women to avoid
the health problems [of] unintended pregnancies” (2) “helps safeguard the
health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening” and (3) “secures benefits wholly unrelated to pregnancy,
preventing certain cancers, menstrual disorders and pelvic pain”).
121. See id. at 2801 (arguing that the government has shown there is no
mean which would be less restrictive on Hobby Lobby and achieve (1) “satisfy
the challenger’s objections” and (2) “carry out the objectives of the ACA’s
contraceptive coverage requirement”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at
2802 (claiming that the least restrictive means under RFRA cannot “require
employees to relinquish benefits accorded to them by federal law in order to
ensure their commercial employers can adhere unreservedly to their religious
tenets”).
122. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The most
straight forward alternative the Court asserts would be for Government to
assume the cost of providing…contraceptives…to any women who are unable
to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’
religious objections”).
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government to pay for employers’ objections would not only be
financially infeasible but it would essentially defeat the purpose of
RFRA’s least restrictive means requirement. 123 In effect, the
government could never burden an individual’s religious beliefs
because there is always a least restrictive means; the government
could foot the bill for the alleged burden. 124 However, Least
restrictive does not, and should not, mean entirely unrestrictive. 125
The Intermediate and Current Eras are strikingly similar
because both focus primarily on political issues under the First
Amendment. 126 Unlike the Intermediate Era, the Current Era
Court expands corporate rights rather than restrict them. 127 The
conflict of the Current Era is not found between cases, but rather
between majorities and dissents. Heated debates are sparked
within the Court, fueled by the inherently political focus of the
Current Era. 128
Additionally, the Court subtly shifts its view of corporations
from legal entities separate from the individuals who constitute
them to associations of individuals whose rights need to be
protected. 129 The Court’s opinions in Citizens United and Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. are antithetical to the expressed
concerns of political corruption and the natural theory of
corporations prevalent in the Intermediate Era. 130
123. See id. at 2801-02 (arguing that the least restrictive means has not
been satisfied by offering the alternative that the government pays for the
coverage).
124. See id. (noting that the government footing the bill for the alleged
burden will always be available as a least restrictive means).
125. Id. (arguing that the RFRA’s least restrictive means requirement
cannot cause employee’s to forfeit their federally mandated healthcare
coverage so as not to offend their employer’s religious convictions and remain
least restrictive).
126. See e.g., Citizens United (concerning corporations’ free speech rights
under the First Amendment); see also Hobby Lobby (concerning corporations’
free exercise rights under the First Amendment).
127. See, e.g., Citizens United (expanding corporate free speech under the
First Amendment to allow corporations to donate money from their general
treasury to political candidates); see also Hobby Lobby (expanding corporate
free exercise under the First Amendment to provide corporations religious
exemptions from federal law when that law substantially burdens the
sincerely held religious beliefs of the corporation’s owners).
128. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459,
1499-1502 (discussing the debates between majority and dissenting justices in
Citizens United over case precedent and stare decisis).
129. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (“associations of citizens – those
that have taken on the corporate form – are penalized for engaging in the
same political speech”) (emphasis added); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2768 (“A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to
achieve desired ends…. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people
[associated with the corporation]”).
130. See Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First
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E. Are Corporations Really People, My Friend?
The Early Era of corporate personhood firmly supported a
functional economic view of corporations. It granted corporations
rights to facilitate production and economic growth. The tension of
the Intermediate Era arose out of the Court’s attempt to change
that view. The Court wrestled with attempting to justify the
established model of economic efficiency with the seemingly
incompatible imposition of corporate free speech. In contrast, the
Current Era Court takes the notion of “personhood” quite literally,
attempting to expand the rights of corporations to equal that of
natural persons. Current Era decisions stand in opposition to their
predecessors because they posit the idea that corporations can
believe. 131 Is corporate belief even a logically sound concept
considered in light of the historical rise of corporate personhood?
Or is it a recent development inconsistent with the purpose and
development of the modern corporation? To answer these
questions, this section investigates the legal theories that support
corporate entities and analyzes the relationship between specific
constitutional amendments and those theories.

F. The Artificial Nature of Corporations
Unlike people, corporations do not exist naturally in the
world; instead corporations are created by law. 132 Legally, a
corporation is an entity, which has the power to act above and
beyond the capacity of its shareholders. 133 Economically,
corporations produce goods and services. 134 The legal and economic
natures of corporations are virtually inseparable from one
another. 135 The prospect of economic growth entices the state to
Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV . 317, 357 (1991) (stating
that the Court in Austin and Bellotti adopts a natural theory of corporations).
131. Corporations “believe”, insofar as they assert the religious beliefs of
their owners.
132. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 636 (stating that corporations are “artificial
beings existing only through the law”).
133. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (Bryan A. Garnered et al. eds., 4th ed.
2011) (“[C]orporation: An entity having authority under law to act as a single
person distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue
stock and exists indefinitely”); see also id. (“[C]orporate veil: The legal
assumption that the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its
shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt from liability for the
corporation’s actions”).
134. Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE
WESTERN RES. L. REV . 1043, 1044 (2008) (discussing the nature of shareholder
investments as a belief that corporations provide a convenient way to produce
goods and services which can in turn be sold for profit).
135. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 826 (Rehinquist, J., dissenting) (noting that state
laws create corporations, grant them limited liability and deny other rights
unrelated to those purposes).
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legitimize a corporation’s existence. 136 At the same time, a
corporation’s legal existence is necessary for significant economic
growth. 137 Thus, these inseparable concepts create a legaleconomic dichotomy.
Corporate transformation in the United States from the
nineteenth to the twentieth century shifted the understanding of a
corporation from a purely legal entity to an economic entity
concerned with profit. 138 This gave rise to three distinct corporate
features – a corporate anatomy: shareholder stock, board of
directors, and limited liability. First, corporations became property
by developing advanced banking and stock trading techniques. 139
One’s ownership stake in a corporation, known as “stock,” entails
all of the rights and obligations of everyday tangible property. 140
Second, collective corporate stock ownership created the
modern board of directors by turning a corporation into
property. 141 Typically, a corporate board of directors owns the
majority of stock and performs various functions within a
corporation, including: selecting officers, managing public and
labor relations, determining what products or services the
company will provide for sale, etc. 142 In essence, the board of
directors is a collection of elected officials who both own and make
decisions for the corporation. 143
136. See Phillips L. McWilliams, Magnolia North v. Heritage Communities:
The South Carolina Court of Appeals’ End Run Around the Necessity of
Equitable Justifications when Disregarding the Corporate Form, 64 S.C. L.
REV . 825, 830 (2013) (stating that limited liability – a legal creation of the
state – was developed to promote economic growth and generally incorporate).
137. See Brier K. Miron, Federal Common Law Versus State Law: Can A
Federal Common Law Veil-Piercing Standard for Indirect Cercla Liability of a
Parent Corporation Satisfy the Kimbell Foods Test?, 39 SOUTHWESTERN L.
REV . 513, 538 (2010) (noting that corporations promote economic growth by
offering limited liability which protects investors and encourages them to take
risks).
138. Donald J. Smythe, Note, Shareholder Democracy and the Economic
Purpose of the Corporation, 63 WASH. & LEE . L. REV . 1407, 1408 (2006)
(arguing that the transformation of the purpose and function of corporations
in the United State had a profound effect on the conceptual understanding of
corporations).
139. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 148-54 (1997) (tracing the historical
development of inter-corporate stock ownership).
140. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the
Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV . 827, 867 (2005) (noting that
generally restraints on alienation of corporate stock is against public policy).
141. ROY, supra note 139 at 154-58 (discussing the powers a corporation’s
board of directors and its evolution through the 19th century).
142. See Arthur A. Ballantine, Directors and their Functions, 59 HARV . L.
REV . 151, 152 (describing the various functions typically carried out by a
corporation’s board of directors).
143. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of
Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM . J. COMP. L. 317 (placing the board
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Finally, and most importantly, a board of directors receives
limited liability protection. 144 Limited liability is the idea that the
corporation itself is responsible and liable for the actions of the
corporation and its employees/agents and individual members are
excluded from personal liability, barring criminal action by
individual members. 145
Shareholder stock, the board of directors, and limited liability
are common features of modern corporations in America. 146 They
constitute the internal anatomy, which allows corporations to
function efficiently in today’s marketplace. 147 The legal doctrine of
corporate personhood is an external attribute of corporations. If
properly applied, it enables a corporation to accomplish the
economic purposes for which the state originally sanctioned its
incorporation. 148 Together, the internal anatomy and external
legal doctrine create a metaphorical habitat for corporate existence
and growth. Each time the Court alters its interpretation or
application of corporate personhood, it creates new external space
in which corporations can operate. 149

G. Initially the Supreme Court Promoted Economic
Efficiency by Expanding Corporate Personhood
The Court was increasingly concerned with the Fourteenth
Amendment during the Early Era of corporate personhood. 150 The
Fourteenth Amendment is the most beneficial constitutional
provision for corporations because it protects them from unfair
of directors in a position of control and decision making in the traditional
American corporate structure).
144. Id. at 158-64 (commenting on the rise of corporate limited liability in
the 19th century as one of the most beneficial aspects of a corporation).
145. See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial
Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability , 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1310
(2007) (discussing the equitable doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” when
the protections of limited liability ought to be denied).
146. See supra notes 139-141 (expounding the elements of a corporate
anatomy: limited liability and shareholders stocks).
147. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J.
1519, 1525 (2004) (noting the significance of the board of directors within the
anatomy of a corporation); id. at 1524 (stating that the common structure
[anatomy] of corporations are: personhood, limited liability, transferability of
shares, board of directors, investor ownership).
148. See Steven Cherensky, A Penny For Their Thoughts: EmployeeInventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property and Personhood , 81
CALIF. L. REV . 597, 659 (1993) (linking the concept of corporate personhood
with the promotion of economic efficiency).
149. Take for example Bellotti, the Court granted corporations the limited
right to finance ballot initiatives. This allowed the space for corporate external
growth insofar as corporations were permitted to venture into previously
uncharted territory and fund ballot initiates in their political favor.
150. See supra Part II.A (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment’s
prevalence in the Early Era).
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state regulation and allows them to operate at a higher level of
efficiency. 151 State governments not only create corporations
through corporate charters, but they regulate nearly everything
they do. 152 The Fourteenth Amendment provides corporations a
means of relief from overly burdensome state regulations. 153
Further, by recognizing corporations as “persons,” the Fourteenth
Amendment makes corporate action possible. 154
While the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes corporations as
persons under the law, the Court’s Fourth Amendment
interpretation also secures corporate property. 155 In addition, the
Early Era afforded corporations both Fifth Amendment and
Seventh Amendment rights. 156 The Fifth and Seventh
Amendments functionally work together and solidify a
corporation’s potential legal actions in court. 157 Nevertheless, the
impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on corporate personhood
cannot be understated. Comparatively, it is used as a corporate
shield far more frequently than the Bill of Rights is used as a
corporate weapon. 158
During the Early Era the Court followed a uniform
understanding of corporations supported by a single purpose when
it extended Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to

151. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the
Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579 (1990) (noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment acted as a shield, protecting corporations from state regulations
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and today it aids
corporations in fighting similar issues).
152. See Scarlett, supra note 37, at 572; see also Douglas G. Smith, The
Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98
NW. U. L. REV . 239, 253-54 (arguing that state amendments at the end of the
19th century which prohibited special corporate charters recognizes the
inherent and traditional ability of the state governments to grant corporate
charters and create corporations).
153. See Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and
the Limits of Progressive Originalism, 19 WM . & MARY BILL RTS . J. 369, 378
(2010) (noting that the enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment
require Congressional legislation to counteract and afford relief against State
regulation).
154. See Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 394 (recognizing corporations as
“persons” under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment).
155. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307 (recognizing corporations’ right to
protection from unwarranted searches and seizures).
156. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 517 (extending the Double Jeopardy
Clause to corporations); see also Ross, 396 U.S. at 531 (affording corporations
Seventh Amendment rights to jury trial).
157. See generally Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 37 G EO. L.J.
ANN. REV . CRIM . PROC. 605 (2008) (discussing the general application of the
Fifth Amendment at trial); see also Ross, 369 U.S. at 531.
158. Mayer, supra note 151, at 593 (noting that although the Supreme
Court recognizes Fourth Amendment protections for corporations, it is
infrequently utilized).
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corporations. 159 Namely, the Court followed a natural entity theory
of corporate law and aimed at promoting the economic efficiency of
corporations. 160 The natural entity theory holds that a relationship
between shareholders and a corporation creates the corporation,
but the corporation exists separate and distinct from the
shareholders themselves. 161 The Court promoted corporate
economic efficiency because recognizing the independent existence
of corporations from both state law and shareholder motives
allows corporations to act. 162

H. The Supreme Court’s Current Expansion of
Corporate Personhood Does Not Promote Economic
Efficiency
In contrast, the Court’s expansion of First Amendment rights
to corporations does not promote economic efficiency. 163 This is
because First Amendment expansion is based on a different view
of corporations. 164 Rather than looking at corporations as entities
created by a relationship between shareholders, which exist
separate and independent of that relationship, the Court adopts
an aggregate theory of corporations. 165 That is, the Court views
corporations as nothing more than the sum of the individuals who
own it. 166 This rationale allows the Court to afford First
159. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 317 (extending Fourth Amendment rights
to corporations and recognizing the importance of efficiency); see also Martian,
430 U.S. at 564; see also Bernhard, 369 U.S. at 531.
160. See Charles D. Watts, Corporate Legal Theory Under the First
Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV . 317, 326-28 (1991)
(discussing the role of natural entity theory and the expansion of corporate
rights).
161. J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the
Limited Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26
J. CORP. L. 951, 972 (2001) (comparing natural entity theory and artificial
entity theory and noting that while natural entity theory retained the
corporation’s separate existence it added that corporations are created by the
shareholders, not the state).
162. See Julie Marie Baworowsky, From Public Square to Market Square:
Theoretical Foundations of First and Fourteenth Amendment Protection of
Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 1713, 1738 (2008)
(discussing how a natural entity theory allows corporations to act independent
of investor management and remain unchanged despite alterations among
shareholder contracts).
163. Teneille R. Brown, In-Corp-O-Real: A Psychological Critique of
Corporate Personhood and Citizens United, 12 FL. ST. U. BUS. REV . 1, 47
(2013) (claiming that First Amendment expansion, based on aggregate theory,
cannot be adequately relied on).
164. Id.
165. See Watts, supra note 160, at 329-30 (explaining the aggregate theory
of corporations and how it came to be recognized).
166. Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the
Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV . 1061, 1062 (1994) (defining the aggregate
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III. FREE SPEECH AND CITIZENS UNITED
The Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United, which afforded
corporations free speech under the First Amendment, relied on an
aggregate theory of corporations. 168 The majority specifically
states, “[t]he association of individuals in a business corporation is
no different [from individuals speaking in association through the
Republican or Democratic party].”169 This opinion clearly indicates
that the Court adopts an aggregate theory of modern corporations.
It relies on the premise that corporations exist and act through a
relationship among shareholders. 170
However, as the dissent observed, the majority failed to
address the effects of this rationale on shareholder investment
protection. 171 That is, the corporation’s free speech exercise may
undermine
the
shareholders’
political
convictions. 172
If
corporations are permitted to donate to political campaigns, some
shareholders will find their investments effectively working
against them. 173 For example, when shareholders do not politically
theory as the idea that “a corporation is the sum of human constituents and
nothing more”).
167. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (equating corporations to
“associations of citizens” who have taken on “corporate form”); see also Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (stating that the purpose of affording corporations
rights is to protect the people who are associated with the corporation).
168. See Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 O KLA. L.
REV . 327, 341 (2014) (noting the “triumphant ascendance” of the aggregate
theory of corporations in Citizens United after it began to take a foothold in
the 1970’s in Buckley); see also Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A
Corporate Law Analysis of Free Sp eech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens
United, 61 CASE WESTERN RES . L. REV . 497, 519 (2010) (arguing that the
Court’s reasoning in Citizens United is a return to the aggregate theory of
corporations).
169. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392 (responding the dissent’s opinion that
corporations are not individual Americans).
170. Id. at 343 (rejecting the argument that corporations should be treated
differently under the First Amendment because they are not natural persons).
This implies that the Court’s view of corporations no longer consists of an
entity derived theory, but rather a theory which views shareholders as an
association constituting the corporation. Id.; see also Watts, supra note 130, at
329-30 (explaining the principles of the aggregate theory of corporate
personhood).
171. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
majority’s failure to adequately address the issue of shareholder investment
protection).
172. Id. (“[S]hareholders who disagree with the corporation’s electoral
message may find their financial investments being used to undermine their
political convictions”).
173. Id. (asserting that an effect of allowing corporations to donate to

914

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:889

endorse the same candidate as the corporation, they may find their
financial investments opposing their political beliefs.
The counterargument to this political dissonance supposes
that the democratic microcosm of the corporation will redress the
issue. 174 In other words, investors can bring suit for breach of
fiduciary duty to remedy political abuse committed with their
investments. 175 However, these derivative suits are essentially
meaningless and ineffective. 176
Further, it fails by overlooking the issue for union members
who are required to pay dues, whereas shareholders choose to
invest. 177 Thus, members feel the effects of their union’s free
speech political donations more intensely. To illustrate, imagine
being required to pay dues to a union. The trade offs seem
reasonable, but dues are required and there is no option not to
contribute. Then envision that those required fees are donated to a
political campaign fundamentally irreconcilable with your political
ideologies. Where the investor can actively choose to sell their
share or avoid investing in corporations who donate to an
objectionable political cause, the union member’s options are
exceedingly limited: pay the dues and ignore the reprehensible use
of your money, or quit. Although this may seem like stretching an
example to its logical extreme, since Citizens United it has quickly
become a shocking reality.
The debate between the majority and dissent in Citizens
United brings corporate personhood out of an economic
background and onto the political stage. The Court is not only
concerned with protecting the corporation as if it were a person; it
also seems determined to make the corporation a “political animal”
as well.178 This new focus indicates a conceptual shift in how the
political candidates from their general treasury is the adverse effect it would
have on shareholders who invest money in the corporation but do not share
the political beliefs of the corporation).
174. Id. at 370 (acknowledging that the corporate democracy will
sufficiently address potential shareholder objections raised as a result of
inconsistent political opinions between shareholders and the corporation).
175. Id. at 361 (speculating that abuse of shareholder investments may be
remedied “through the procedures of corporate democracy”).
176. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the rights of
shareholders to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty against
corporations are so limited they are almost nonexistent); see also Adam
Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV . 133, 165-66, 199-200 (1998)
(noting that within a corporate structure in which corporations were allowed
to donate to political campaigns, management and not shareholders would
make decisions on who to endorse. The dissenting shareholders who did not
agree with management’s endorsement would have virtually non -existent
protection under the current corporate democratic structure).
177. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 476-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(responding to corporate democracy as a proposed solution to political abuse of
shareholder investments).
178. See Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV .
457, 464-465 (commenting on how Citizens United further embodies the
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Court understands the nature of corporations. The Court’s view of
corporations is no longer aimed at promoting economic efficiency
as before. The conceptual movement away from economic
efficiency and corporate natural theory to political power and
aggregate theory is further developed in Hobby Lobby.

A. Free Exercise and Hobby Lobby
The majority’s rationale behind Hobby Lobby is identical to
the opinion of the Court in Citizens United.179 The Court states
that the purpose of affording corporations protection, whether
statutory or constitutional, is to protect the rights of people
associated with the corporation. 180 This rationale is the foundation
of the aggregate theory. 181 It posits that corporations are created
through a relationship of associated human beings and this
relationship extends constitutional rights to corporations. 182 By
choosing to operate in an association, individuals do not sacrifice
their constitutional rights; they can exercise them through the

corporation in terms of corporate personhood); see also Aristotle, Politics, bk I,
at 1235a (this is my own translation) (“man is by nature a political animal” ζῷον πολ ιτικόν [Zoion Politikon] derived from πόλ ις [polis] meaning “city”
implying that part of man’s unique “political” nature resides in the
communicative capacity of speech).
179. See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm – From
Nature to Function, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV . 1, 17 (Summer 2013) (pointing out
that the Citizens United Court relied on an aggregate theory of corporate
personhood in responding to the question: whether “corporate speech differed
from that of individual political speech”). The Hobby Lobby Court conflated
Hobby Lobby, as a for-profit corporate entity, with the majority shareholding
family, the Greens. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also Elizabeth M.
Silvestri, Note, Free Speech, Free Press, Free Religion? The Clash Between the
Affordable Care Act and the For-Profit, Secular Corporation, 48 SUFFOLK
U.L.REV . 257, 278-80 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hobby Lobby was not possible under an artificial person theory [artificial
entity theory] of corporate personhood). The outcome of Hobby Lobby required
the Court to presuppose an aggregate theory analysis of corporations. Id.
180. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (stating that corporations are
organizations created by human beings to achieve desired ends, extending
constitutional protection to corporations preserves the constitutional rights of
those who create the corporation).
181. Tucker, Flawed Assumptions, 61 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV . 497, 519
(2010) (arguing that the Citizens United Court returned to the aggregate
theory of corporate personhood first utilized in Buckley and Bellotti).
182. See Malcom J. Harkins III, The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Healthcare Act, and the Corporate Person:
How a Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 305 (2014) (defining aggregate theory of corporate
personhood and noting that under this theory individuals are not required to
surrender their constitutional rights because they associate with one another
in corporate form).

916

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:889

corporate form. 183 If the Court refused to recognize the free
exercise rights of corporations; individuals would not necessarily
forfeit their constitutional rights. Namely, because individuals
who constitute a corporation, under aggregate theory, are free to
pursue their constitutional rights in their individual capacity as
private citizens.
On the one hand, free speech grants corporations the ability
to voice their political concerns. 184 In turn, this could indirectly
promote economic efficiency by letting corporations have a say in
how states regulate them. 185 On the other hand, corporate
economic efficiency is not promoted, either directly or indirectly, by
affording corporations religious rights. Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood avoid a significant financial burden by not
incurring penalties under ACA, but this addresses Hobby Lobby’s
net profit and not the economic efficiency historically focused on
when expanding corporate rights. 186
Thus, in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby the Court alters its
view of corporations. Originally, the Court adopted the view that
corporations are merely convenient fictions created by law. 187
During the Early Era, the Court held a natural theory of corporate
personhood. 188 This supported the understanding that shareholder
relationships create corporations, yet corporate action occurs
independent of any individual shareholder. 189 In contrast, the
183. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392 (recognizing that the association
of individuals within a corporate context is no different from any other form of
association).
184. See David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law:
Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV . 1197,
1223 (2011) (discussing the capacity for corporations to utilize the holding of
Citizens United to focus the shareholders into a political voice).
185. See Baworowsky, supra note 162, at 1743-44 (noting that voices of
individuals who constitute the corporation are deemphasized when a corporate
entity theory prioritizes state control above corporate autonomy); see also
Yosifon, supra note 184 (contrasting alternative corporate entity theories
which adopt complete corporate autonomy and arguably grant too powerful a
political voice).
186. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776 (noting that Hobby Lobby could
potentially face $26 million in fines under the ACA for refusing to provide
contraceptives).
187. See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 637 (“A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law”); see also
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 429 (quoting Dartmouth).
188. See Watts, supra note 130.
189. See Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and
Business Associations, Article, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L 515, 535 (2001) (defining the
natural entity theory as the idea that corporations are real and they exist
separate from the state and individuals which compose them); see also Thomas
P. Byrne, False Profits: Reviving the Corporation’s Public Purpose, 57 UCLA L.
REV . DISCOURSE 25, 33 (2010) (contrasting artificial entity theory and natural
entity theory on the basis that natural entity theory “posits that the
corporation is not created by the state – via a charter or otherwise – but is
instead a creation of its owners, the shareholders”).

2016]

A Step Too Far

917

aggregate theory underlies the Court’s current interpretation of
corporate personhood. 190 The aggregate theory of corporations
blurs the separation between the shareholders and the entity
created by their association. 191 This leads to a blurred separation
between the corporation’s liability and shareholders’ limited
liability, which could seriously harm economic efficiency. 192

IV. CORPORATIONS SHOULD FEAR AGGREGATE THEORY
E XPANSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Contrary to the corporate victory that Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby appear to create, corporations should fear the
potential consequences of corporate personhood expansion under
the aggregate theory. 193 The Court’s application of aggregate
theory to corporate personhood in Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby poses a potentially fatal risk to corporate limited liability. 194
Considering that natural entity theory directly supports limited
liability, further expansion of First Amendment rights under
aggregate theory may remove limited liability’s underlying
justification. 195

190. See e.g., Tucker, Flawed Assumptions, 61 CASE WESTERN RES . L. REV .
497, 513-20 (2010) (arguing that the Citizens United court utilized an
aggregate theory of corporate personhood).
191. Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate
America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder
Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 904 (1996) (claiming the aggregate theory’s
distinguishing characteristic is its “atomized” composition, being comprised by
shareholders, whereas natural entity theory recognizes the corpo ration as a
distinct legal entity).
192. See id. (alluding to aggregate theory’s elusive distinction between
shareholders, and the corporate entity itself).
193. See Melissa Steffan, Hobby Lobby Solidifies ‘Major Victory’ Against
HHS Contraceptive Mandate, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (July 30, 2013),
www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2013/june/hobby-lobby-tenth-circut-hhscontraceptive-mandate.html (discussing Hobby Lobby as a victory in the tenth
circuit); see also Genelle I. Belmas & Jason M. Shepard, Speaking from the
Bench: Judicial Campaigns, Judges’ Speech, and the First Amendment , 58
DRAKE L. REV . 709, 731 (2010) (discussing the view that Citizens United
constitutes an important victory for the First Amendment).
194. See Padfield, supra note 168, at 337 (claiming that the problem with
aggregate theory for corporations is that it ignores the separation of ownership
from control). In essence, the corporation is reduced do wn to a general
partnership – allowing liability for the shareholders. Id.
195. Ronaldo J. Colombo, The Corporation, 85 TEMP. L. REV . 1, 13 (2012)
(“[e]ven the hallmark corporate characteristic of limited liability received
explanation and justification from natural entity theory”).
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A. The Positive and Negative Effects of Natural Entity
Theory
A natural entity theory of corporate personhood denies
corporations the right to unrestricted political donations and the
right to circumvent federal law through religious exemptions. 196
This is because natural entity theory recognizes the existence of a
separate and independent corporate entity. 197 The separate
corporate entity creates distance and protects shareholders from
liability. 198 Consequentially, it prevents shareholders from
asserting their constitutional rights through the corporation
because the corporation and shareholder are not identical. This
difference is the aggregate theory’s main contention with the
natural entity theory. 199 However, despite this potentially negative
feature, the natural entity theory provides more benefits to
shareholders than it takes away.
Limited liability is the most positive and beneficial aspect of
the corporate anatomy. 200 Under natural entity theory, limited

196. Holly P. Anderson, How to Reach the Gridlocks Solution without
Feeding the Alligators: Why Multiple-Matching Provisions is the Key to Public
Campaign Financing, 15 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 169, 177 (2014)
(noting that the controversy of Citizens United is that it granted corporations
the right to spend unrestricted amounts of money on political expenditures)
(citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310); see also Julie Dabrowski, The Exception
that Doesn’t Prove the Rule: Why Congress Should Narrow ENDA’s Religious
Exemptions to Protect the Rights of LGBT Employees, 63 AM . U. L. REV . 1957,
1977-78 (2014) (commenting on the potential risks of future litigation within
the scope of RFRA religious exemptions provided to for-profit corporations
under Hobby Lobby).
197. Suzana Sawyer, Disabling Corporate Sovereignty in a Transnational
Lawsuit, 29 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV . 23, 31 (2006)
(explaining the effect that limited liability under natural entity theory is a
further separation of shareholders, owners and corporations); Katherine Pratt,
The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV . 1055,
1096 (explaining the dependency of limited liability on the existence of a
corporate entity remaining separate from the shareholders).
198. See G. Edward White, Transforming History in the Postmodern Era,
91 MICH. L. REV . 1315, 1333 (1993) (noting that the natural entity theory poses
several superior aspects over other alternative theories; namely, protecting
shareholders with limited liability for corporate action); see also Colombo,
supra note 195, at 13 (“[e]ven the hallmark corporate characteristic of limited
liability received explanation and justification from natural entity theory).
199. See Brett W. King, Supermajority Voting, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 904
(1996) (articulating the difference between natural entity theory and
aggregate theory).
200. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 59 (1990) (explaining that the natural
entity theory of corporate personhood recognizes the essential components of
the corporate anatomy – particularly, limited liability); see also White, supra
note 198 (discussing the view that a natural entity theory provides advantages
because it recognizes the internal changes of a corporation; including, limited
liability).
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liability is significantly strengthened because it is logically
consistent with a natural theory of corporate personhood. 201 The
natural entity theory recognizes corporations as distinct legal
entities that arise out of shareholder relationships. 202 In doing so,
it serves as a reasonable middle ground between fictional entity
theory and aggregate theory. The artificial entity theory
significantly limits the rights of corporations and shareholders by
only legitimizing corporations as convenient fictions under the
law. 203 The aggregate theory over-expands the rights of corporate
shareholders by failing to recognize the separate existence of
corporations from their shareholders. This deteriorates the
inherent and essential limited liability protection afforded to
shareholders through incorporation. By assuming the middle
position between the deficient extreme of fictional theory and the
excessive extreme of aggregate theory, natural entity theory
directly supports shareholder limited liability. 204 Limited liability
is a massive benefit to the shareholders, managers and owners of
any corporation because it protects shareholders and corporate
managers from direct responsibility for the unforeseen
consequences of a corporation’s actions.

B. The Positive and Negative Effects of Aggregate
Theory
What natural entity theory lacks in allowing shareholders to
exercise their individual rights through a corporation, aggregate
theory recognizes. Aggregate theory provides corporations rights
most similar to those held by private citizens. 205 These rights
include free exercise and free speech under the First
Amendment. 206 Aggregate theory is capable of expanding corporate
rights under the First Amendment because it operates off the idea
201. Id.; Kathrine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best
World, 53 VAND. L. REV . 1055, 1096 (2000) (“natural entity theory was thought
to be consistent with the special corporate characteristics of limited liability”).
202. Byrne, supra note 189, at 33 (explaining that under a natural entity
theory, the corporation is created by the shareholders, and not the state).
203. See id. (contrasting natural entity theory and artificial entity theory);
see also Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 637 (“A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law”).
204. Colombo, supra note 195 at 13 (“[e]ven the hallmark corporate
characteristic of limited liability received explanation and justification from
natural entity theory”).
205. Brown, supra note 163 (“[A]ggregate theory allowed corporations to
enjoy some of the benefits of private citizens”).
206. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (recognizing the free exercise
rights of corporations by extending religious exemptions to for -profit
corporations under RFRA); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310
(extending free speech to corporations by allowing them to donate money to
political campaigns).
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that the rights and duties of a corporation are identical to the
rights and duties of the natural persons who constitute that
corporate entity. 207 The real benefit is not to the corporation itself,
but to the shareholders whose corporation is no longer an
imaginary legal fiction but an actual legal entity under the law. 208
In turn this means that the rights of shareholders are more
readily recognized under the aggregate theory. 209 However, the
positive ramifications of aggregate theory only apply to the
shareholders, managers and owners of corporations, not to its
employees. 210
Although the aggregate theory of corporate personhood
provides an arguably positive effect for corporate shareholders, the
benefit received is significantly smaller than the risk. Aggregate
theory weakens shareholder protection under limited liability by
legitimizing corporate “individual” rights through the rights of
corporate shareholders.
Under the aggregate theory, corporations do not act
independent from the shareholders or separate from the owners. 211
Instead, those with authority (e.g. owners, shareholders,
management, CEO, CFO etc.) act through the corporation. 212 This
ideology distorts the once-clear distinction between corporate
shareholders and the corporation itself. 213 It is inconsistent with
207. See Brown, supra note 163, at 28-29 (stating that an aggregate theory
of corporate personhood asserts that the rights and duties of a corporation –
an association of sorts – are identical to the rights and duties of the citizens
who make up the corporation); see also Susan Kim Ripken, Corporate First
Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular
Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations , 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 209, 221 (2011) (noting that the aggregate theory advocates the
position that corporations cannot exist nor identify with anything that is
separate from the natural persons in the corporation).
208. See Brown, supra note 163, at 29 (discussing how aggregate theory
transforms corporations from imaginary beings to real entities).
209. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and
the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV . 887, 928
(2011) (claiming that modern aggregate theory recognizes that corporations
hold individual rights and act through fiduciaries) (quoting David Millon,
Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsi bility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305 (2007)).
210. See generally Dabrowski, Exception, 63 AM . U.L. REV . 1957, 1977-78
(2014) (discussing the potential negative effects of corporate religious
exemptions on homosexual, bisexual and transgender employees).
211. See Phillips, supra note 166, at 1084 (1994) (asserting that under an
aggregate theory of corporate personhood, justifying limited liability becomes
difficult because the theory fails to recognize the corporation as a distinct legal
entity).
212. Brown, supra note 205, at 106 (stating that the Justices who
supported Citizens United understood that “corporations can only act through
humans”).
213. See Joanna M. Meyer, The Real Error in Citizens United, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV . 2171, 2183 (2012) (explaining that an aggregate theory of
corporate personhood distorts the corporate form).
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limited liability. 214 If corporate action is only made possible
through human beings who associate to achieve a desired goal,
then corporate action is the direct product of human action. 215 In
this situation, the protective aspects of limited liability lose their
efficacy. 216 An individual cannot, in good faith, deny responsibility
for his or her own actions. 217 Thus, shareholders as the source of
corporate action must assume full responsibility for those actions.

C. Natural Entity Theory Protects Corporations,
Shareholders and Employees
To ensure that limited liability, as well as other vital aspects
of the corporate anatomy, remain fully intact, corporations ought
to be cautious about petitioning for further expansion under the
First Amendment. 218 The Supreme Court must return to analyzing
corporations through the lens of natural entity theory. Limited
liability depends on the view that corporate actions are separate
from shareholder actions and that both are separate entities. 219
The aggregate theory of corporate personhood is fundamentally
detrimental to that view because it systematically breaks down a
barrier separating shareholders from the corporation. 220 Under the
214. Id.
215. See id. at 2184 (claiming that one of the inherent flaws of corporate rights theory is the circular logic that underpins it. That is, corporations are
often defined by merely listing the characteristic that they have in common
with natural persons).
216. See Daniel R. Kahan, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A
Historical Perspective, 97 G EO. L.J. 1085, 1092 (2010) (recognizing that limited
liability significant shareholder protection from enormous judgments against
corporations).
217. See generally JEAN-PAUL SARTRE , BEING AND NOTHINGNESS : A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ESSAY ON O NTOLOGY, pt. 4, Ch. 1, § III: Freedom and
Responsibility 529-34 (Hazel E. Barnes, Trans., Citadel Press 2001) (1956)
(discussing the existential ramifications of absolute freedom; namely, the
inescapable responsibility one must accept through choice).
218. See generally Adam Winkler, Yes, Corporations are People – and
That’s Why Hobby Lobby Should Lose at the Supreme Court, SLATE (Mar. 14,
2014, 11:52 AM), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence
/2014/03/corporations_are_people_and_that_s_why_hobby_lobby_should_lose_
at_the_supreme.html (noting the potential for an aggregate theory
interpretation of corporate personhood to deprive corporations of limited
liability protection).
219. See John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing
the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to
Codify the Test for Waiving Owner’s Limited Liability Protection , 75 WASH. L.
REV . 147, 175 (2000) (noting that under limited liability circumstances,
shareholders and corporations are legally separate beings) (quoting Labandie
Coal Co. v. Blank, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir 1982).
220. See Phillips, supra note 166, at 1083-84 (discussing the effects of
aggregate theory on limited shareholder liability and the difficulties that arise
when corporate rights and shareholder rights are identical).
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current trend of corporate personhood, corporations must decide
between exercising their right to use corporations as mechanisms
for political and religious agendas or the continued stability of
limited liability. They can have one or the other, but not both.

V. CONCLUSION
The
history
of
corporate
personhood in American
jurisprudence extends back nearly 200 years. 221 Throughout that
long history, the Court’s decisions that expand corporate rights
divide into three distinct eras: Early Era, Intermediate Era, and
Current Era. 222 While the Intermediate Era serves as a
transitional period marked by inconsistent decisions, the Early
Era and Current Era conform to two different theories of corporate
personhood. 223 During the Early Era, when expansion of corporate
rights was primarily targeted at maximizing economic efficiency,
the Court viewed corporations under a natural entity theory. 224
The natural entity theory recognizes corporations as legal entities
that are created by a relationship among shareholders and operate
independently. 225 This logic strengthens the most vital aspect of a
corporation: limited liability. 226
In the Current Era, the Court adopted the aggregate theory of
corporate personhood. 227 Under an aggregate theory, decisions like

221. See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of
Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV . 1135,
1148 (2012) (noting that the language of “artificial being” and “mere creature
of law” from Dartmouth College [1819] – which marks the beginning of
corporate personhood – still remains today); see also Kyle J. Weber, Corporate
Personhood and the First Amendment: A Business Perspective on an Eroding
Free Exercise Clause, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 217, 221 (2012)
(commenting that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dartmouth College “laid the
foundation for an evolving theory of corporate personhood”).
222. See supra Part II. A-C (explaining the backgrounds of the Early,
Intermediate and Current Eras)
223. See supra Part II. B (discussing the transitory nature of the
Intermediate Era of corporate personhood).
224. See supra Part III. B (noting the Supreme Court’s expansion of
corporate rights under the Old Era focused on promoting economic efficiency).
225. John C. Costas IV, State Takeover Statute and Corporate Theory: The
Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV . 806, 818 (1989) (stating that the
natural entity theory of corporate personhood recognizes the corporation’s
existence as a separate and distinct legal entity).
226. See Colombo, supra note 204, at 13 (noting that the natural entity
theory supports limited liability); see also White, supra note 198, at 1333
(asserting the superiority of natural entity theory to alternative the ories
because it recognizes the importance of providing limited shareholder
liability).
227. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (recognizing the free exercise rights
of corporations by extending religious exemptions to for-profit corporations
under RFRA); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (extending free speech
to corporations by allowing them to donate money to political campaigns).
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Citizens United and Hobby Lobby establish controversial
precedents by expanding corporate First Amendment rights. 228
Now, because the Court views corporate rights and individual
rights as identical, corporations can exercise free speech by
donating money to political campaigns and gain special
exemptions from laws that offend their religious beliefs. 229 The
potential detriment to limited liability under aggregate theory far
outweighs the immediate benefits of expanding corporate First
Amendment rights. 230 In order for the aggregate theory to
recognize the rights of shareholders as equivalent to the rights of
the corporation, it must ignore the barrier of limited shareholder
liability.
Corporations should be cautious about petitioning the Court
for further expansion of their First Amendment rights. The
mentality of piercing the corporate veil on narrow issues is not
sustainable in this current legal age. While the immediate benefits
of corporate free speech and free exercise may seem appealing, the
long-term effects of aggregate theory will prove fatal to the
corporate structure.

228. See Fredrick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraceptive Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV . C.R.-C.L.L. REV . 343, 377 n.153 (2014)
(noting the controversy surrounding Hobby Lobby); see also Anthony J.
Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age of Super PACS, 60
DRAKE . L. REV . 755, 792 (2012) (noting the controversial nature of Citizens
United).
229. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (expanding corporate rights
under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
230. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (expanding corporate rights
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
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